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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J E R R Y V. STRAND, 
Plaintiff-Appellee j 
vs. 
P R I N C E - C O V E Y & CO., 




BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JERRY V. STRAND 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T 
The plaintiff agrees with the defendant's statement 
of fact except in one important particular. 
The defendant claims that the plaintiff J E R R Y 
S T R A N D filed no affidavit to support his purported 
ownership of the stock or to support any other allega-
tion in his complaint (see defendant's brief page 3). 
The plaintiff's deposition was taken prior to hearing 
1 
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on the motion for Summary Judgment and at the hear-
ing the defendants, themeslves, moved to publish that 
deposition. The deposition, under oath, supports all 
the allegations to plaintiff's complaint. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E R E IS NO I S S U E O F M A T E R I A L F A C T 
The defendants urge this court to reverse the lower 
court by attempting to point out two "unresolved issues 
of fact". In so doing, the defendants failed to con-
sider a substantial portion of the record that was be-
fore the lower court and also this court. That part of 
the record was plaintiff's deposition. Somehow, in pre-
paring their brief, the defendants overlooked that it 
moved for and was granted the publication of plain-
tiff's deposition (R-22). That deposition, under oath, 
answers all of the "unresolved issues" that defendants 
have raised. 
The defendant in its brief states that the plaintiff 
at no time averred under oath to support its proposi-
tion that he owned the stock in question (defendant's 
brief, page 3). However, on page 6 and again on 
pages 9 and 10 of plaintiff's deposition, he testified as 
to his ownernship. In addition, the plaintiff's allega-
tion of ownership was further supported by the de-
fendant's own agent's affidavit. 
2 
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Q. Now, you allege that in your complaint that 
at least as of J anua ry 13, 1972 that you were the 
owner of 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources, 
Inc., common stock; is that correct?1 
A. If that's the date in the complaint, yes. I 
don't recall right now. 
Q. That 's the date in the complaint. 
A. All right. 
Q. When did you purchase these shares ? 
A. I was constantly trading in the Hoffman 
stock both as stock and as a riding option on 
stock, so as to these specific shares it was—they 
may well be acquired pursuant to an option or 
they may have been purchased, but I specifically 
don't remember right now what specific dates 
they were acquired. 
Q. Where were you purchasing the stock ? 
Through what broker? 
A. Some of it were through individuals. Some 
of it was through various brokers, both in this 
city and other cities. 
Q. D o you keep any records of these transae-
action ? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. D o you have those records in your posses-
sion? 
A. I have them in my possession, yes. Ei ther I 
or Elmer Fox has those records. 
Q. Elmer Fox being your accountant? 
i The evidence before the trial court was that 4,000 shares of 
stock and not 6,000 shares of stock were picked up on the 
occasion which is the subject of this law suit. 
3 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall the certificate numbers on these 
6,000 shares? 
A. I don't recall them but I do have a copy of 
the receipt I think that was given to Ted Eng-
land for the stock. (Plaintiff's deposition pages 
6 and 7) 
These averments were not denied under oath by de-
fendants at the Summary Judgment hearing. In its 
answer the defendants only denied plaintiff's owner-
ship because of lack of information. 
After Summary Judgment was granted, defend-
ant's attorney filed an affidavit inferring circumstan-
tially that plaintiff was not the owner of the stock 
in question. The affidavit was not before the court at 
the time of the hearing on the motion for Summary 
Judgment and, therefore, was not properly considered 
by the lower court. The affidavit was filed in support 
of a motion to set aside the Judgment pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
court denied the motion because the information had 
always been in the defendant's attorney's knowledge 
and could not be considered newly discovered evidence, 
mistake, inadvertance, surprise, nor would it support 
any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b). 
In the affidavit, defendant's attorney averred some 
weeks before the alleged conversion that plaintiff testi-
fied in a Supplemental Proceeding that he did not own 
any Hoffman stock. Even if the affidavit had been be-
fore the court on Summary Judgment, it would not 
4 
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have raised a genuine issue of material fact. The affi-
davit seeks to circumstantially infer that because some 
weeks prior to the conversion plaintiff had testified he 
did not own the stock. He, therefore, could not have 
owned the stock at the time of conversion. The circum-
stantial inference was refuted by direct evidence by 
both the plaintiff in his deposition and defendant's 
agent in his affidavit. Even defendant's attorney aver-
red that plaintiff had testified that he had options on 
a considerable amount of Hoffman stock. Thus, the 
affidavit would not raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. Had defendants filed their affidavit before the 
hearing, plaintiff could have easily answered, under 
oath, how he exercised his options and acquired owner-
ship to the stock between the time of the Supplemental 
Hearing and the conversion. 
The other supposed "unresolved issue of fact" is 
the date upon which plaintiff discovered the conversion. 
This would be material for the purposes of assessing 
damages. However, on page 18 and again on page 21 
of plaintiff's deposition, plaintiff testified concerning 
the date that he discovered the conversion. 
Q. Now, you've alleged in your complaint that 
September 13, 1972 was the date at which the 
conversion took place. Do you—were you aware 
on September 13 that's when the conversion took 
place? 
A. Was I aware at the time, is that your ques-
tion ? 
Q. Right. On September 13, yeh. 
5 
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A. I was aware after—well, approximately that 
time perhaps, within a day or two. 
Q. In other words, around September 13, 14, or 
15, you became aware that your stock had been 
sold? 
A. That's correct. 
(Plaintiff's deposition page 18) 
The unresolved issues of facts raised by defendant 
in their brief were not unresolved and had the defend-
ants read the entire record — including plaintiff's 
deposition— they would have discovered the answers. 
P O I N T I I 
P L A I N T I F F IS E N T I T L E D TO 
J U D G M E N T AS M A T T E R O F L A W 
A. The defendant was not a bona fide purchaser 
of the stock in question. 
B. Assuming defendant purchased plaintiffs stock 
defendant could not have been a bona fide pur-
chaser as: 
1. Defendant's agent's knowledge of plaintiffs 
ownership would be imputed by law to de-
fendant. 
2. Defendant's retention of the proceeds of the 
converted property ratified their agent's 
conversion. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C. Assuming the knowledge of defendant's agent 
will not be imputed to the defendant, plaintiff is 
still entitled to Summary Judgment as knowl-
edge is not an essential element of a conversion 
action. 
A. The defendant was not a bona fide purchaser 
of the stock in question. 
The defendants attempt to avoid liability by strain-
ing to argue that they did not convert plaintiff's secur-
ities but they purchased them; and that they were bona 
fide purchasers. While plaintiff agrees with the de-
fendant's statement of law concerning bona fide pur-
chasers, the facts simply do not support the plaintiff's 
claim. 
The defendant's own statement of the facts are as 
follows: 
Mr. England agreed that if defendant would 
pay Mr. England's debt to Murray First Thrift, 
thereby obtaining release of the stock, Mr. Eng-
land would sell the stock, repay the defendant 
for the Murray First Thrift payment and use 
the balance of the proceeds to pay or reduce his 
debt (R-20) (defendant's brief pages 2 and 3). 
Mr. Covey accompanied Mr. England to Mur-
ray First Thrift where Mr. Covey delivered de-
fendant's check to pay the loan and Murray 
First Thrift released and delivered to Mr. Eng-
land certificates representing at least 4,000 
shares of Hoffman Resources stock . . . Mr. 
Covey and Mr. England returned to Prince 
Covey & Co. offices where 4,000 shares of the 
stock were deposited in England's personal ac-
7 
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count and sold. Proceeds were given to defend-
ant Prince-Covey & Co. to repay it for the money 
advanced to Murray First Thrift and to pay or 
reduce England's debt to defendant (R-20) (de-
fendant's brief page 3). 
Under no strain of interpretation did those facts amount 
to a purchase of the shares by Prince-Covey & Co. 
The shares were merely sold by Prince-Covey & Co. 
B. Assuming defendants purchased plaintiffs 
stock it could not have been a bona fide pur-
chaser as: 
1. Defendant's agent's knowledge of plaintiffs 
ownership would be imputed by law to de-
fendant 
2. Defendant's retention of the proceeds of 
the converted property ratified their agent's 
conversion. 
The defendant again attempts a strained interpret-
ation of the facts to support its argument that the 
knowledge of its agent would not be imputed to it. 
Again, the plaintiff does not quarrel with the well 
established rule that the knowledge of the agent will 
not be imputed to the principal in transactions where 
in the parties were acting adversly. However, the facts 
simply do not support such a proposition. The defend-
ant and its agent were acting jointly for their mutual 
benefit. The defendant issued its check to obtain secur-
ities that were pledged at a lending institution. The 
defendant and the agent received the stock together 
8 
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and transported the same to the offices of defendant. 
There the stock was deposited in an account at de-
fendant's offices. From there, through the use of de-
fendants facilities as a brokerage firm, the stock was 
sold. The proceeds came from the buying broker to 
defendant and it retained a portion of the proceeds to 
satisfy its position and paid the balance to its agent 
(see defendant's own statement of facts on pages 2 
and 3 of its brief). 
This is not a case where the defendant purchased 
stock from its agent but rather where the two of them 
together sold stock through the defendant's facilities 
and divided the proceeds. I t can hardly be said that 
the agent and the principal's interest were adverse — 
they were the same. 
The fact that England may have had a personal 
interest did not prevent the defendant from being on 
notice as to plaintiff's interest in the stock converted. 
The Restatement of Agency 2d, Section 271 states: 
A notification by or to a third person to or by 
an agent is not prevented from being notice to 
or by the principal because of the fact that the 
agent, when receiving or giving the notification, 
is acting adversely to the principal, unless the 
third person has notice of the agent's adverse 
purposes. 
Consequently, to the extent that England was acting 
on his own behalf as well as for the incidental benefit 
of the defendants, the defendants are liable for his con-
version. Section 274 of the Restatement of Agency 2d, 
states 
9 
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The knowledge of an agent who acquires prop-
erty for his principal affects the interest of his 
principal in the subject matter to the same ex-
tent as if the principal had acquired it with the 
same knowledge, except where the agent is priv-
ileged not to disclose or to act upon the knowl-
edge, or a change in conditions makes it inequit-
able thus to affect the principal. 
Further, subsection c. of the Comment of Section 274 
states: 
Where an agent, having no power to bind the 
principal by the transaction, acquires property 
from a third person by fraud and, without the 
principal's knowledge transfers it to the principal 
to make up for past or future embezzlements, the 
principal takes it subject to a constructive 
t ru s t , . . . 
Section 282 of the Restatement of Agency 2d provides: 
(1) A principal is not affected by the knowl-
edge of an agent in a transaction in which the 
agent secretly is acting adversely to the principal 
and entirely for his own or another's purposes 
except as stated in Subsection (2). 
(2) The principal is affected by the knowledge 
of an agent who acts adversely to the principal: 
(a) if the failure of the agent to act upon or 
to reveal the information results in a violation 
of a contractual or relational duty of the prin-
cipal to a person harmed thereby; . . . 
(c) if, before he has changed, his position the 
principal knowingly retains a benefit through the 
act of the agent which otherwise he would not 
have received. (Emphasis added.) 
10 
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Comment c. to Section 282 of the Restatement of Ag-
ency 2d states : 
c. Meaning of 'acting adversely/ The mere fact 
that the agent's primary interests are not coinci-
dent with those of the principal does not prevent 
the latter from being affected by the knowledge 
of the agent if the agent is acting for the prin-
cipal's interests. The rule as stated herein is sub-
stantially similar to the rule stated in Sections 
235-236, dealing with the liability of a principal 
or master for the torts of his agent, and the 
Comment on those Section is applicable. 
Section 235 of the Restatement of Agency 2d, Com-
ment b. on mixed motives states: 
b. Mixed motives. The servant may be within 
the scope of employment, although his departure 
from instructions in the performance of his work 
is for his own purposes, if his act is done with 
the intent to serve his employer. In such case, 
the rule stated in Section 236 applies. 
Section 236 of the Restatement of Agency 2d provides: 
Conduct may be within the scope of employ-
ment, although done in part to serve the pur-
poses of the servant or of a third person. 
In Barsh v. Mullins, 338 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1959) the 
court held that where a glass manufacturer accepted 
the benefit of an arrangement between one of its em-
ployees and a third party for the transportation of its 
wares in the course of his employment and in the per-
formance of a duty that it had given him the author-
ity to perform, the company was in no position to deny 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
knowledge of the arrangement. The court relied upon 
Section 282 of the Restatement of Agency 2d. 
In Reynolds v. Snow, 197 N Y S 2d 590 aff'd 168 
N E 2d 882 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) the court held that 
under the provisions of Section 282 of the Restatement 
of Agency 2d where a husband acquired stock in viola-
tion of a third party's rights in the name of his wife 
that the knowledge would be imputed to the wife and 
that the third party could recover. 
In 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency, Section 270, the general 
rule is acknowledged that a principal is liable for the 
contracts of his agent where the third person had no 
knowledge of the agent's dereliction. In the instant 
case, the action can be one in conversion or the viola-
tion of the contractual relationship (by conversion) be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant's agent. 
In 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 261 Agency, it is recog-
nized that a principal is liable for the acts of his agent 
within his scope of employment or apparent authority 
which the principal ratifies with knowledge of the facts 
surrounding the circumstances. In the instant case, the 
actions of England were for the direct benefit of the 
defendants' interests and in satisfaction of their ac-
counts and the evidence presented to the court upon 
which the original judgment was based disclosed knowl-
edge on the part of England and the defendants as to 
the impropriety of using the stock in question to satisfy 
England's accounts. Further, the defendants have re-
tained the benefits of the conversion in effect ratifying 
12 
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the acts of England's conversion. When a principal has 
knowledge of acts of his agent which were contrary to 
law, he has a duty to disaffirm those actions at the 
first reasonable moment. If there is any action on the 
part of the principal that indicates his intention to be-
come a party to the transaction it constitutes ratifica-
ion. Moses v. Archie McFarland <§ Son, 119 Utah 602 
P.2d 531 (1951). The Utah court in Thirteenth and 
Washington Street Corp. v. Nelsen, 123 Utah 70, 254 
P.2d 847 (1953) recognized that where a landlord auth-
orizes the conduct of another which amounts to tortious 
conduct, he must bear the responsibility of the conduct. 
In Malta State Bank Commissioner v. Giles, 100 
Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208 (1941), the Utah court was 
concerned with a situation where the pledgee of stock 
received certificates belonging to the wife of a pledgor. 
The court held under the circumstances of that case 
that the pledgee was placed on notice as to the limita-
tion of the apparent authority of the agent. The facts 
of that particular case allow a justifiable inference 
that in this case the defendants should have been on 
reasonable notice that the stock England converted and 
used for their benefit was not free from suspicion. In 
the instant case, the plaintiff acted in good faith and 
with innocence of fradulent actions of England and the 
defendants retained the benefits of their agent's action. 
Under such circumstances, the acceptance of the bene-
fit constituted a ratification and estops the defendants 
from disclaiming liability for conversion. Latsis v. Nick 
Floor, 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940). In the last 
13 
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cited case the court held that where benefits of illegal 
action of an agent are retained by the principal that 
they become liable to an innocent third party as if an 
agent had acted properly. 
A case very similar in legal substance to that of 
the instant action is Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 
328 P.2d 726 (1958). In this action a seed grower 
was the plaintiff against a seed buyer and its agent. 
The seed buyer's agent falsely represented that the seed 
had been purchased from the growers and the agent's 
principal, the defendant, had converted such seed to its 
own use. The court held the defendants liable under 
a theory of conversion stating: 
We consider the second question first: The Com-
pany is clearly liable for the full value of the 
seed which Malin sold to it without authority to 
do so from the grower. For by taking posses-
sion of such seed upon delivery from Malin who 
had no right to make such sale or delivery, the 
Company converted such seed to its own use. By 
such conversion the Company became liable to 
the grower for the full value of such seed less 
the amount which the grower received from it as 
advancement. 
A conversion is an act of willful interference 
with a chattel, done without lawful justification 
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived 
of its use and possession. The measure of dam-
ages of conversion is the full value of the prop-
erty. I t requires such a serious interference with 
the owner's right that the person interfering 
therewith may reasonably be required to buy the 
goods. Although conversion results only from 
14 
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intentional conduct it does not however require 
a conscious wrongdoing, but only an intent to 
exercise dominion or control over the goods in-
consistent with the owner's right. A purchaser 
of stolen goods or an auctioneer who sells them 
in good faith becomes a converter since his acts 
are an interference with the control of the prop-
erty or in other words, a claiming of the owner-
ship in such property and taking it out of the 
possession of someone else with intention of ex-
ercising dominion over it is a conversion. Thus 
a bona fide purchaser of goods for value from 
one who has no right to sell them becomes a con-
verter when he takes possession of such goods. 
Under the theory of the above recited cases of the 
Utah Supreme Court, it is apparent that the defend-
ants were liable for the conversion of plaintiff's stock, 
and that as a matter of law they have no defense based 
upon the position of their agent or the fact that his 
knowledge may have been adverse to the plaintiff since 
the acts were definitely beneficial to the defendants and 
the defendants retained the benefits of the conversion. 
C. Assuming the knowledge of the defendant's 
agent will not be imputed to the defendant, 
plaintiff is still entitled to Summary Judg-
ment as knowledge is not an essential element 
of a conversion action. 
Even assuming the defendant and its agent were 
acting adversely so that the agent's knowledge of plain-
tiff's ownership could not be imputed to defendant, 
such knowledge is irrelevant. The law is clear that a 
conversion action will lie whether or not the defendant 
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knows that the property he converts belongs to plain-
tiff. 18 Am. Jur. 2nd Section 7 Conversion 162 states: 
Generally, the motive the defendant acts with is 
immaterial in an action for conversion. Liability 
for a conversion is not necessarily precluded by 
the fact the defendant acts . . . sincerely, inno-
cently . . . or in ignorance of the plaintiff's in-
terest in the properties . . . An action for con-
version does not rest on the knowledge or intent 
of the defendant. 
The present case is controlled by the above-stated 
general rule which has been followed consistently by 
the Utah Supreme Court. In the case closely in point, 
Alfred v, Hinkley, supra, Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although conversion results from intentional 
conduct it does not however require a conscious 
wrong doing but only an intent to exercise do-
minion or control over the goods in-consistant 
with the owners right. 
In the present case, the defendant Prince-Covey 
& Co. exercised dominion and control over the plain-
tiff's securities and interferred with his right therein 
so that the defendant is liable regardless of whether or 
not it knew that the securities were owned by plaintiff. 
D. Value is not an issue. 
The general rule is that plaintiff, upon conversion 
of his securities, is entitled to the value thereof within 
a reasonable time after his notice of the conversion. 
The Western Securities Company v. Silver King Con-
solidated Mining Company of Utah, 57 Utah 88 192 
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Pac. 664, 672 (1920). The affidavit of Mack E. Me-
Bride which was not controverted by the defendant 
established a price within two weeks of plaintiff's 
knowledge of the conversion. The court was proper 
in holding that two weeks was a reasonable time. 
The defendants attempt to argue that the Judg-
ment should not have been granted or once granted 
should have been set aside because plaintiff was incor-
rect about the date of the conversion. However, the 
date of the conversion is immaterial. I t is the date 
plaintiff receives notice of the conversion that is im-
portant. Western Securities Co. v. Stiver King Con-
solidated Mining Company of Utah, supra. The un-
contradicted evidence is that plaintiff learned of the 
conversion on September 13th, 14th, or 15th (see de-
position page 18). The date of conversion whether in 
August or September is unimportant. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R I N 
D E N Y I N G D E F E N D A N T S MOTION TO S E T 
A S I D E J U D G M E N T A N D FOR R E H E A R I N G 
The defendants sought relief from the court's 
judgment heretofore entered by invoking the provision 
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The motion to set aside the judgment and for rehear-
ing does not specify what portion of Rule 60(b). Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants contend justi-
fies the court in relieving the defendants from the 
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judgment currently against them. In their brief, de-
fendants' specify Rule 60(b)(7) . Rule 60(b) U.R.-
C.P. provides: 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neg-
lect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been dis-
covered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b) ; (3) fraud (whether heretofore de-
nominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-
tion or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the de-
fendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) 
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judg-
ment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective ap-
plication; or (7) any other reason justifying re-
lief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken . . . 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
patterned after Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and therefore decisions of courts and 
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authorities treating the Federal rule are useful in de-
termining whether defendants are entitled to any relief. 
The motion of defendants supported by an affi-
davit from Almon Covey concerning Ted England's 
duties and responsibilities relates to the scope of his 
authority. As noted heretofore where an agent con-
verts property of a third person and turns it over to 
his principal for their mutual benefit, the conversion is 
complete and if the fruits of the conversion are re-
tained, there is no question as to scope of authority. 
Further, nothing is set out in the affidavit of Almon 
Covey which is either newly discovered or was not 
known at the time of the original action. Second, the 
contention that there is no proof of ownership is not 
supported by the record. Plaintiff testified in his de-
position that he owned the stock (plaintiff's deposition 
pages 6, 9, and 10). That deposition was published at 
the hearing for Summary Judgment (R-22). The affi-
davit of Ted England, the person who converted the 
plaintiff's stock and who was defendant's agent, avers 
plaintiff's ownership. Further, the affidavit of Ted 
England asserts the belief that Almon Covey also knew 
of the fact that plaintiff owned the stock in question. 
Nothing is added in any of the affidavits of any of the 
parties that was not known or could not have been as-
certained at the time of the original hearing. The affi-
davits would appear to raise ethereal contentions lack-
ing any substance when analyzed against the issues 
raised in the complaint and the matters considered at 
the time the court granted Summary Judgment. Fur-
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ther, the new contentions made with reference to the 
date of conversion were equally capable of discovery 
and subject to presentment to the court at the time of 
the motion for Summary Judgment. 
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v Shaw, 
273 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1959), the court denied relief 
under Rule 60(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
where there was a question of ownership of a chattel in-
volved in the litigation. The court concluded that the 
evidence of ownership of the trailer could readily have 
been discovered before trial. To the extent that there 
is any substance to defendants' contentions with refer-
ence to the ownership of the stock, a position plaintiff 
contends is specious, the fact could have been deter-
mined within the time for presentation of the motion 
for Summary Judgment and therefore relief under 
Rule 60 (b) is not available. 
In Flett v. W. ui. Alexander and Co., 302 F.2d 
321 (7th Cir. 1962) cert. den. 371 U.S. 841 (1962), 
the court denied relief under Rule 60(b) because there 
was no adequate showing that the newly discovered 
evidence could not have been discovered by the exercise 
of due diligence. Moore, supra. Para. 60.234 notes: 
The evidence must be such as was not and could 
not by the exercise of diligence have been dis-
covered in time to present in the original pro-
ceeding. 
In DiSilvestro v. U.S. Veterans Administration, 
9 F D R 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) the court denied relief 
under Rule 60(b) (2) where the evidence in question 
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was within the moving parties knowledge at the time 
of the original proceedings. In the instant case, it is 
apparent that the contentions which defendants advance 
in support of their motion for relief from judgment 
were well within their knowledge or ability to ascertain 
prior to the time this court originally rendered judg-
ment. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Valmont 
Industries, Inc. v. Enresco, Inc., 446 F.2d 1193 (10th 
Cir. 1971 ) upheld a denial of relief on the grounds that 
a party did not use diligence when he failed to locate 
foreign patents before judgment. The patents were 
located in the patent office in two places and plaintiff 
did not search one place, did search the other place, but 
failed to find the subject matter. In Caribou Four 
Corner's Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 443 F.2d 
796 (10th Cir. 1971), the court upheld the denial of 
relief from a judgment on the grounds of newly dis-
covered evidence when the alleged mistake by the party 
was that he had given the wrong insurance policy to 
opposing counsel and to the court when he had the new 
policy in his files all the time. In United States v. 
Aerodex, Inc., 327 F . Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla. 1970). 
the court denied a motion for relief from judgment 
where the defendants knew of the testimony of wit-
nesses who did not testify. The above federal cases 
clearly support the contention of plaintiff that de-
fendants' motion should be denied. 
A similar position was taken in Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). In 
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that case, the Utah court noted with reference to the « 
status of a person seeking relief from a default judg- ) 
ment: "however, the movant must show that he has J 
used due diligence and that he was prevented from ap-
pearing by circumstances over which he had no control." \ 
In McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293, 104 Pac. 
731 (1909) the court refused to grant relief from a 
judgment under statutory provisions comparable to 
Rule 60 (b) (Revised Statutes of Utah 1898 Sec. 3005). 
The court stated: 
". . . a party . . . must show that he has used 
due diligence to prepare and present his defense, 
and that he was either prevented from doing so 
because of some accident, misfortune, or circum-
stance over which he has no control; or that he 
has been misled or lulled into an action by some 
agreement or act of the opposite party or his 
counsel upon which he had a right to rely. This 
appellant has wholly failed to do (Peterson v. 
Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860)." 
A similar position was reached by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P.2d 
995 (1956). Although the Utah court has recognized 
that the trial court in making a determination to set 
aside a judgment has substantial discretion, Cutler v. 
Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 99 Pac. 897 (1907), relief is 
not automatic and must be based upon a justifiable 
basis under the rules. Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. 
Neilson Land and Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 Pac. 
911 (1913). 
The case of Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 
P.2d 28 (1962) appears to be applicable to the instant 
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motion of defendants. In that case, the Utah court 
held the trial court had abused its discretion in grant-
ing relief. The court observed: 
We are in accord with the proposition urged by 
the defendant that the trial court has broad dis-
cretion in granting new trials; and in allowing 
relief under Rule 60(b). But its power is not 
without limitation and cannot be exercised cap-
riciously or arbitrarily. I t is elementary that 
under usual circumstances the regular rules of 
procedure are binding, and that a party who has 
allowed the time to move for a new trial to expire 
is thereafter precluded from doing so. This can 
be avoided only where it is made to appear that 
for one or more of the reasons specified in Rule 
60(b) justice has been so thwarted that equity 
and good conscious demand that this extraordin-
ary relief be granted. And the burden of show-
ing facts to justify doing so is upon him who 
seeks such relief. 
In order to warrant the granting of a new trial 
on the ground of belatedly discovered evidence, 
relied on by the plaintiffs, it would have to ap-
pear both that it 'by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial'; 
and that such evidence was of sufficient sub-
stance that there would be a reasonable likeli-
hood of a different result. Otherwise, it is ob-
vious that the ends of justice would not be served 
by ordering a new trial. 
Sparing the detail of plaintiffs' affidavits, it is 
sufficient to say that any evidence referred to 
therein having any probative value on the dis-
puted issues appears to be so meager that we 
cannot believe there is any likelihood that it 
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would produce a different result. But more sig-
nificant, and of controlling importance, is the 
fact that no reason whatsoever is given to show 
why such evidence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for a new trial, nor in fact to 
have been presented on the original trial. There-
fore, there existed no proper bases for granting 
relief under Rule 60(b). 
No reason is given why the arguments now ad-
dressed to the court could not have been earlier pre-
sented. Under Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P., relief is not avail-
able from error resulting from mere carelessness. 7 
Moore's Federal Practice, page 254. In Kahle v. Am-
torg Trading Corporation, 13 F R D 170 (D.C.N.J. 
1952), relief was sought from a Summary Judgment. 
The motion for the relief was predicted under Rule 
60(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
affidavit in support of relief from the judgment in-
dicated that additional correspondence was available 
which at the time counsel thought was of no import-
ance or relevance. There was no indication that the 
evidence was not available prior to Summary Judg-
ment. The motion to set aside the judgment was 
denied. The court observed: 
I t seems obvious from the affidavit that the mis-
take, if any, was that of plaintiffs, who admitted-
ly delivered only part of their file to the attorney 
who then represented them; the affiant admits 
that he withdrew from the file and delivered to 
the attorney only the documentary evidence 
which he 'believed to be pertinent to the claim.' 
The plaintiffs may not have been aware of the 
'importance or relevance' of the documentary 
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evidence which they now offer, but this did not 
relieve them of the duty to make full disclosure 
to their attorney, who was competent to appraise 
the evidence. The course which they pursued 
was improvident but it was nevertheless inten-
tional. 
. . . I t is our opinion that under the circum-
stances the plaintiffs may not be relieved of an 
adverse judgment on their representation that 
they are in possession of additional evidence 
which they thought 'was of no importance or 
relevance' when the motion was argued. If sum-
mary judgments are vacated on such tenuous 
grounds they will lack finality and the very pur-
pose of Rule 56 . . . will be defeated. There will 
be no end to litigation. 
The plaintiffs would not be entitled to prevail 
if the present motion were predicted on the 
grounds defined in subdivision (b) (2) of the 
Rule, (citing cases) The conditions prescribed 
by this subdivision are not present in the in-
stant case. May the plaintiffs unable to meet 
the requirements of subdivision (b)(2) , avoid 
them by an expedient resort to the grounds 
enumerated in subdivision (b) (1)? I t is our 
opinion that the answer must be in the negative, 
especially where, as here, the mistake was a mis-
take of judgment ascribed solely to the plain-
tiffs . . . 
This is not a case in which a litigant failed to 
defend because of 'mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect', the case in which 
subdivision (b) (1) is usually invoked . . . The 
plaintiffs were accorded a hearing on the motion 
and were afforded a full opportunity to present 
the evidence in their possession, including the 
evidence upon which the present motion rests. 
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Moore ,supra, page 257 notes: 
Parties desiring such relief must particularlize, 
and do not acquit themselves of responsibility by 
showing merely that they placed the case in the 
hands of an attorney. 
Where a party who makes an informed choice as 
to a particular course of action seeks relief, the mere 
fact that the choice was unfortunate is not a basis for 
relief from judgment. See Samson v. Radio Corpor-
ation of America, 434 F.2d 315 (2nd Cir 1970). The 
decisions from the Utah Supreme Court are of a sim-
ilar nature. In Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 
373 P.2d 573 (1962), then District Judge Ellett re-
fused relief under Rule 60(b) from a judgment on 
the grounds of inadvertence and excusable neglect. The 
Supreme Court affirmed finding that where defendant 
had notice of the action and the intention of the op-
posing counsel to act in a particular fashion and failed 
to act to protect his client's interests that relief from 
a default judgment would not be granted. In Ledwith 
v. Storkan, 2 F E D 530 (1942), it was observed: 
I t is manifest that facts here do not involve 
either mistake or surprise. If relief may be 
granted at all it must rest either upon 'inadvert-
ence' or 'excusable neglect.' 
I t may be added that while inadvertence and 
neglect are not precisely identical in their con-
notations they are often classified as synonymous 
. . . And finally, though in the rule, and in the 
statutes underlying it, the word 'excusable' does 
not precede the word inadvertence unless it is 
actually excusable. 
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Precisely what circumstances will avail to render 
the neglect of counsel excusable may not be ad-
equately set down. But some measure of excus-
ability may be gotten from decision where relief 
has been granted. They include (a) continuous 
preoccupation with the trial of a distracting first 
degree murder case, (b) reliance on assurance 
by the Court or a clerk thereof or opposing 
counsel as to the time of trial, (c) Failure to 
reach the place of trial in consequence of casual 
ties in traffic (d) sudden illness of counsel, (e) 
unanticipated summons to the bedside of a dying 
relative, and other like incidents. In each in-
stance there was inadvertence or neglect which 
intercepted the timely performance of a required 
act, but there was likewise some disturbing and 
distracting events which rendered the error ex-
cusable. 
Inevitable, the argument of the defendant must 
proceed to the point where they assert, that hav-
ing employed counsel for the protection of their 
interests, they did all that could be expected of 
them and are entitled to absolution from re-
sponsibility for their attorney's negligence. But 
that seems not to be a tenable position, for by 
the weight of authority the negligence of coun-
sel in this behalf is imputed to his client. 
A similar result was reached in Peterson v. Crosier, 29 
Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860 (1905) and Salt Lake Hard-
ware Company v. Neilson Land and Water Co., Supra. 
See also Restatement of Judgments, Section 126(e) 
and (f) and Example 7 on page 617. In Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Co., supra, the Utah court cited Section 
126 of the Restatement of Judgment with approval. 
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In Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 
384 P.2d 806 (1963), the Utah court refused to set 
aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) where the reason 
for the neglect was a complaint on the merits and 
where the defendants asserted the reason for failing to 
answer was that they thought the summons was invalid. 
The motion and accompanying papers submitted 
by defendants does not justify relief under the broad 
provisions of 60(b) (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. That provision is identical with 60(b) (6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In commenting 
on its application in Summary Judgment situations, 
Professor Moore notes, 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 
page 362: 
The principles governing judgments entered 
after a trial generally should govern summary 
judgments, as the latter are dispositions on the 
merits in which the attack is normally upon the 
substantive correctness of the decision. Judg-
ments disposing of a case without consideration 
of the merits (default judgments, voluntary dis-
missals, and dismisals for failure to observe the 
Rules and others of the court) present somewhat 
different considerations, for they must be con-
sidered against a background of general prefer-
ence for disposition of cases on their substantive 
merits. 
In the instant case, the summary judgment process 
afforded the defendants every opportunity to present 
the merits of their case. They cannot now be heard 
to seek relief after the fact. Further, it is well settled 
that relief under a general clause of Rule 60(b) must 
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be on a basis other than would justify relief on any of 
the other specifically stated subsection. In 7 Moore's 
Federal Practice, page 343, it is observed: 
I t is important to note, however, that clause (6) 
contains two very important internal qualifica-
tions to its application: first, the motion must be 
based upon some reason other than those stated 
in clauses ( l ) - ( 5 ) ; and second, the other reason 
urged for relief must be such as to justify relief. 
See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949). 
No articulation of any basis that would justify relief 
other than those set out in the particularized clauses is 
contained in defendants' motion. The clause is not a 
substitute for appeal, 7 Moore, supra, page 348, and 
courts require "exceptional and compelling circum-
stances" before a party will be granted relief from a 
judgment under the general clause. Moore, supra, page 
348. I t is submitted that in the absence of some more 
precise articulate reason to justify relief that the de-
fendans have not stated any basis why a motion should 
be granted relieving them from the judgment hereto-
fore entered. 
As noted in other parts of this brief, there is no 
such thing as a general motion for reconsideration 
under Utah law. See also Drury v. Lunleeford, 8 
Utah 2d 74, 515 P.2d 662 (1966). The defendants 
have filed their motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides only a 
very limited base for relief. I t does not justify relief 
on a basis that could have been originally urged at the 
time of consideration of the matter which led to judg-
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ment. Procedurally it is a narrow remedy. I t is not a 
basis for re-argument of matters previously considered 
or for consideration of evidence that otherwise could 
have been presented. Considering the application of 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure within the 
parameters of its limited application and the insipid 
basis urged by defendants for relief from the judgment, 
it is apparent that defendants have not made out a 
basis for relief under any of the subsection of Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The mo-
tion of the defendants was properly denied. 
P O I N T IV 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
NOT ORDER A SET-OFF 
For the first time in its brief on appeal the de-
fendant urges that the Utah Supreme Court should 
order a set-off. The defendants did not allege a set-
off in their answer; and as pointed out by the defend-
ants, intervening liens may have attached to the judg-
ment. These matters should be resolved in the lower 
courts in the proper manner and not decided on a basis 
of first impression on an incomplete record in the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no genuine issue of a material fact — all 
of the "unresolved questions of fact" that defendants 
attempt to raise are answered in that portion of the 
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record which contains plaintiff's deposition and which 
somehow was overlooked by the defendants. 
As a matter of law the plaintiff is entitled to re-
covery for conversion as the defendant was not a pur-
chaser of the stock however, assuming that it was, it 
could not be a bona fide purchaser as the knowledge of 
its agent concerning plaintiff's ownership would be 
imputed to the defendant and the defendant's retention 
of the proceeds of the conversion ratified the conver-
sion of its agent; further, knowledge of plaintiff's own-
ership is unimportant in a conversion action. 
The judgment should not have been set aside by 
the lower court as the defendants have raised nothing 
new that they could not have raised by exercising rea-
sonable diligence and the grounds under which the de-
fendants seek relief are not supported by Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court should not order a set-
off as the same was not pleaded by the defendants; the 
lower court has not had a chance to rule yet on the 
priorities of liens that may have attached to the judg-
ment and there is no record upon which the Utah 
Supreme Court could base a decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R I C H A R D J . L E E D Y 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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